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IUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF WHITE,
CAPERTON, AN D CITIZENS UNITED
BY CHARLES GARDNER GEYH
THOSE WHO SUPPORT JUDICIAL ELECTIONS pledgeallegiance to judicial accountability.' For proponents,elections hold judges answerable to the people they
serve; they are democracy-enhancing; and they curb the
excesses of "activist" judges predisposed to disregard the
law and implement their ideological preferences. From this
perspective, the alternative of a commission-based appointive
system (a.k.a. "merit selection") deprives citizens of their right
to vote, delegates the task of judicial selection to an elitist
cabal of experts, and moves the politics of judicial selection
from the ballot box to the backroom.
Opponents of judicial elections, in contrast, salute the star
spangled banner of judicial independence. 2 Judicial elec-
tions undermine judicial independence, opponents argue,
when: they lead judicial candidates to commit themselves to
deciding future cases in particular ways; candidates receive
campaign support so substantial as to appear beholden to
their supporters; and incumbents are put at risk of losing
their tenure for being affiliated with an unpopular political
party, for invalidating unconstitutional but popular laws, or
for upholding the rights of unpopular litigants. Merit selec-
tion is preferable, they argue, because judicial tenure should
not turn on the outcome of popularity contests and because
commission-based appointive systems diminish the corrosive
influence of money in the selection process.
Between ardent proponents and opponents is a third group
that can be characterized as incrementalists. It includes
judicial election proponents who acknowledge that hotly
contested elections can threaten judicial independence in
ways that concern election opponents. It likewise includes
thoughtful election skeptics who concede the political inevita-
bility of judicial elections in jurisdictions where the judiciary's
legitimacy with the public turns on judges being selected in
a democratic process. Incrementalists would retain judicial
elections in jurisdictions that have them, but look for ways
to minimize their adverse affects on judicial independence by
regulating judicial campaigns. And so, incrementalists have
advocated such reforms as longer terms between election
cycles, public financing of judicial campaigns, disclosure
requirements for campaign contributions, contribution limits,
restrictions on campaign speech and conduct, judicial per-
formance evaluations, moving from partisan to non-partisan
races, and judicial disqualification of judges whose campaign
speech and conduct calls their impartiality into question.
In the past decade, the Supreme Court of the United States
has decided three cases of particular relevance to elected
judiciaries. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, decided
in 2002, the Supreme Court declared that judicial candidates
had a First Amendment right to announce their views on
disputed legal issues that may come before them as judges.4
In Caperton v. Massey Coal Company, decided in 2009, the
Court decided that when a person with a personal stake in a
case pending before a judge lends independent support to the
judge's election campaign so substantial as to create a likeli-
hood of judicial bias, due process demands disqualification
of the judge. Finally, in Citizen's United v. Federal Election
Commission, the Supreme Court ruled that corporations have
a first amendment right to undertake independent campaigns
on behalf of candidates for elected office .6 For the reasons
elaborated upon below, all three cases can be used to bolster
arguments against judicial elections-arguments that are
unlikely to move election proponents. For incrementalists,
White and Citizen's United complicate their lives by restricting
the permissible reach of governmental regulation of campaign
conduct, while Caperton creates a limited opportunity for
more incremental reform.
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
Broadly construed, White implies that every Code of Conduct
restriction on judicial speech must survive the exacting test
of strict scrutiny, which bodes ill for a host of rules limiting
campaign speech and association. Narrowly construed, White
simply invalidated the "announce clause," which few states
employed and which the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
jettisoned twelve years before White was decided because it
imposed unwarranted restrictions on the rights of judicial
candidates to express their views on issues of the day.
In the years since White, the lower courts have been called
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upon to apply White to other rules and in different settings,
with inconsistent results. Some courts have invalidated rules
barring judges from making pledges, promises or commit-
ments;7 others have upheld them." Some courts have struck
down rules prohibiting judges from engaging in electioneering
of various kinds;' others have upheld them.10
At a minimum, however, White enables judicial candidates
to make campaign issues of the questions they are likely to
decide as judges. Candidates who worry that taking public
positions on matters they will decide later could compromise
their impartiality may decline to discuss their views, but do
so at their peril in hotly contested races when voters may
punish their silence. It is unsurprising, then, that issue-based
judicial campaigns have become more prevalent post-White,
in jurisdictions that have relaxed their restrictions on judicial
speech the most.1
White troubles many election opponents, because it portends
to turn judicial races into referenda both on future rulings,
to the detriment of judicial impar-
tiality (insofar as judges appear to
pre-commit themselves to a result For incremer
before the case is heard), and on complicated th
past rulings, to the detriment of by creating a ci
judicial independence (insofar
as judges risk loss of tenure for overahow farech
making unpopular decisions).
For them, White presents another running afoul of t
good reason to replace judicial
elections with merit selection.
Election proponents, however, often applaud White, because
it entitles candidates to provide voters with information
that the electorate regards as important to its decision. For
incrementalists, White has complicated their reform agenda,
by creating a cloud of uncertainty over how far regulators
may restrict campaign speech and conduct without running
afoul of the first amendment.
Insofar as White forbids regulators from putting a fence at
the top of the cliff to stop independence and impartiality-
threatening campaign speech and conduct, incrementalists
have proposed judicial disqualification as an ambulance at the
cliff base to ensure that unpreventable speech and conduct
does not impair the fairness of subsequent judicial proceed-
ings. Such a remedy was suggested by Justice Kennedy in
his concurrence in White,12 and in 2003, the American Bar
Association followed suit with a rule requiring that judges
disqualify themselves from proceedings in which the judge
made a prior extrajudicial statement "that commits or appears
to commit the judge to ... rule in a particular way."13 While
some election proponents have argued that disqualifying
judges who exercise their first amendment rights is itself a
first amendment violation, lower courts have-with isolated
exceptions-rejected that view.'4
Caperton v. Massey Coal Company
Caperton concerned a different kind of judicial campaign-
related disqualification problem that arises when a campaign
supporter has an interest in a case pending before the judge.
In 1999, the ABA amended the Model Code to require dis-
qualification when parties or lawyers appeared before a judge
to whose election campaign they had directly contributed
amounts in excess of a dollar threshold." Virtually no state
had adopted that rule, however, which in any event did not
address the problem in Caperton, because Caperton concerned
an independent campaign (not a direct contribution) by the
CEO of a party (not the party itself).
To ensure a fair tribunal that satisfied due process require-
ments, the Court (quoting Withrow
v. Larkin) declared that disquali-
ists, White has fication is necessary when "the
reform agenda, probability of actual bias on the
d of uncertainty part of the judge or decision-maker
Ltors may restrict is too high to be constitutionally
dtolerable."" Applying a probabilityaof bias standard to the facts of
first amendment. the case, the majority found that
the "campaign contributions-in
comparison to the total amount
contributed to the campaign, as well as the total amount
spent in the election-had a significant and disproportionate
influence on the electoral outcome."" In addition, it found
that this "significant and disproportionate influence-coupled
with the temporal relationship between the election and the
pending case-'offer a possible temptation to the average
... judge to . .. .[1ead him not to hold the balance nice,
clear and true.""" The Court therefore concluded that "[o]n
these extreme facts, the probability of actual bias rises to an
unconstitutional level."'
Like White, Caperton may raise more questions than it
answers. Other than to say that non-disqualification will
pose due process problems only in exceptional cases, the
majority offered little guidance for future application of its
probability of bias test. In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts
posed forty questions that, in his view, the majority's opinion
left unanswered. 20
ntal
eir
ou
ula
an
the
79
ADVOCATE *WINTER 2010
Election opponents can argue that to avoid the perils Caperton
sought to address and the uncertainties Caperton left to linger,
the simple solution is to end judicial elections altogether,
and with them the need for campaign related spending that
gave rise to Caperton in the first place. On the other hand,
Caperton is unlikely to move election proponents, who may
regard Caperton as wrongheaded or irrelevant to the judicial
selection debate, and who could conceivably use the case
to support an argument that the crisis rhetoric of election
opponents is overblown because the due process clause
operates as a check on elections run amok.
Incrementalists, in turn, may see Caperton as an opportunity.
The Caperton majority took pains to emphasize that the due
process remedy was a rare one, and that states were free
to-and typically did-impose disqualification requirements
that were more stringent than the due process clause required.
That could be viewed as an invitation for the states to avoid the
uncertainties Caperton created by enforcing their disqualifica-
tion rules more rigorously. If problematic cases (in which
litigants and lawyers create the perception that their campaign
support is buying influence from judges before whom they
appear) can be addressed by disqualification under state law,
then the need for Supreme Court intervention is obviated.
Citizens United v. FEC
Citizens United raises the stakes for election opponents
and proponents alike. Gone are prohibitions on corporate
contributions to independent campaigns in support of can-
didates for elective office, and likely gone are prohibitions on
corporate contributions to the candidates themselves. For
election opponents, the door that Citizens United opened
for corporations to exert greater (and arguably dispropor-
tionate) influence over the outcomes of judicial elections, is
another good reason to end judicial elections. For election
proponents, Citizens United is a positive development both
for the first amendment and judicial elections, which-like
White-encourages more speech rather than less and will lead
to a better informed electorate. For their part, incrementalists
may find Citizens United frustrating, insofar as it deprives
them of regulatory authority to limit corporate influence on
judicial races, and the baleful effects of such influence on
judicial independence and impartiality.
Conclusion
In short, White, Caperton and Citizens United each can be
impressed into the service of arguments for and against
judicial elections. Which way one is moved by these argu-
ments will turn in large part on how one envisions the role of
judges in American government. For those who see judges as
politicians in robes, akin to legislators or governors, White and
Citizens United should be received as welcome developments
because they portend to make judicial races more competi-
tive, issue driven affairs-like political branch races. Judicial
elections can hold judges more fully accountable for their
conduct in office if they are high-profile events that scrutinize
the candidates' records closely. For those who see judges as
"different" from other politicians, on the other hand, White
and Citizens United will be more troubling. Those who think
that judges are more likely to rule fairly and on the basis of
facts and law if they are insulated from electoral pressure
and the blandishments of corporate support will flinch at the
prospect of further politicizing judicial selection and may look
more favorably upon a move toward an appointive system.
Caperton, in contrast, offers incrementalists an opportunity
to insulate the judicial process from some of the more cor-
rosive effects of the electoral process. It bears emphasis,
however, that disqualification is a reactive remedy-one that
comes into play after a judge has already made statements or
accepted support that call her impartiality into question. It
may protect future litigants from being caught in the crossfire
of hotly contested judicial campaigns, but is an incomplete
restorative for those committed to preserving the appearance
of impartial justice to the public a large.
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